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Abstract 
When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability 
people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test 
the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the 
interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic 
processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their 
propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias 
group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The 
medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with 
enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. 
The high-logic, low belief-bias group’s relatively unbiased responses came at the cost 
of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These 
findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic 
processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals 
differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is 
proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of 
observed effects. 
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When Logic and Belief Collide: Individual Differences in Reasoning Times 
Support a Selective Processing Model 
During deduction a conclusion’s logical status may conflict with background 
beliefs. For example, the conclusion to the following syllogism is logically valid 
despite being unbelievable: “All mammals can walk. Whales are mammals. 
Therefore, whales can walk”. In contrast, the conclusion to the syllogism below is 
logically invalid despite its apparent believability: “All flowers need water. Roses 
need water. Therefore, roses are flowers” (both examples are taken from De Neys & 
Franssens, 2009). When logic and belief collide, as in these previous syllogisms, 
people often respond on the basis of their prior knowledge, giving rise to a “belief-
bias” effect (see Evans, 2007b, for a review). For example, in their seminal study, 
Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) observed a 71% conclusion acceptance rate for 
invalid-believable conflict problems versus a 10% conclusion acceptance rate for 
invalid-unbelievable non-conflict problems. The conclusions to both of these invalid 
problems should, in fact, be rejected. Evans et al. likewise observed a conclusion 
acceptance rate of 56% for valid-unbelievable conflict problems versus 89% for valid-
believable non-conflict problems. The conclusions to both of these valid problems 
should be accepted.  
The pattern of acceptance rates observed by Evans et al. (1983) gave rise to 
three statistically significant effects: (1) a main effect of a logical validity; (2) a main 
effect of belief; and (3) a logic-by-belief interaction – since belief had a greater 
impact on invalid than valid problems. All three effects have been replicated many 
times (e.g., Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Stupple & Ball, 
2008; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003), with arguably the 
most comprehensive explanation of such findings being the “selective processing 
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model” (e.g., Evans, 2000, 2007a; Klauer et al., 2000). This dual-process model 
(Figure 1) posits the involvement of two distinct types of processes in reasoning: 
relatively superficial, associative “heuristics” driven by prior knowledge and beliefs, 
and more rigorous “analytic” processes involving rule-based inference.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
According to selective processing theorists, belief bias is determined by the 
operation of both the heuristic and the analytic components of the model depicted in 
Figure 1. The default heuristic response is to accept believable and reject unbelievable 
conclusions. This explains why belief bias arises with both valid and invalid 
inferences, thereby accounting for the main effect of belief. However, the analytic 
component of the model is needed to explain the logic-by-belief interaction. If the 
analytic system intervenes during reasoning then a mental simulation process attempts 
the construction of a single “mental model” of the premises. This analytic process is, 
however, itself biased by the believability of conclusions such that reasoners are 
viewed as operating in a “satisficing” manner (Evans, 2007a). Thus, for a believable 
conclusion a satisficing search is initiated for a single mental model that supports the 
conclusion, whereas for an unbelievable conclusion a satisficing search in initiated for 
a single mental model that refutes the conclusion (Figure 1).  
These latter assumptions provide a clear rationale for the emergence of a 
logic-by-belief interaction. When conclusions are valid, despite unbelievable content 
motivating a search for a counterexample model, such a model cannot be found, thus 
limiting the influence of belief-bias. When conclusions are invalid, however, models 
exist that both support and refute such conclusions, thus leading to high levels of 
erroneous acceptance of invalid-believable items and high levels of correct rejection 
of invalid-unbelievable items. 
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Despite the appeal of the selective processing model, recent studies measuring 
the time taken to evaluate presented conclusions appear to challenge the account since 
they reveal increased processing times for conflict problems relative to non-conflict 
problems, particularly on invalid-believable items (Ball, Wade, Phillips, & Quayle, 
2006; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Thompson et al., 2003). The model in Figure 1 provides 
no obvious reason for why conflict problems – especially invalid-believable ones – 
should be subjected to such increased processing effort. According to the model, an 
element of time-consuming analytic processing should be equally likely for all 
problem types.  
To reconcile the selective processing model with chronometric evidence this 
paper addresses the possibility that response-time effects reflect individual differences 
in people’s tendency to respond normatively to belief-oriented problems. In particular, 
we hypothesised that the relatively long response latencies evident in aggregate data 
for invalid-believable problems may primarily reflect the performance of a sub-group 
of individuals who are frequently able to understand the underlying logic of these 
problems (leading to the rejection of fallacious conclusions), but whose reasoning 
strategy requires increased processing effort, leading to prolonged response latencies 
for these problems relative to other ones.  
Supportive evidence for these proposals comes from a study by Sá, West, and 
Stanovich (1999), who demonstrated that high cognitive ability, skills in cognitive 
decontextualisation and dispositions toward active, open-minded thinking are all 
markers for the tendency to avoid responding in terms of the real-world content of 
syllogistic conclusions. Sá et al.’s research therefore attests to the existence of 
reasoners who are motivated and able to decontextualise their reasoning so as to avoid 
what Stanovich (1999) refers to as the “fundamental computational bias” (i.e., the bias 
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to reason according to content rather than form). As Figure 1 indicates, no-one should 
be able to respond logically to invalid-believable problems via either the heuristic or 
the analytic routes within the current version of the selective processing model. The 
heuristic route would lead to conclusion acceptance (as a response bias), while the 
analytic route would permit the discovery of a confirmatory model (via a satisficing 
process) that would also warrant conclusion acceptance. So, participants who do 
manage to respond logically by rejecting invalid-believable conclusions must 
presumably have a unique ability to avoid falling foul of both heuristic and analytic 
biases. In effect, this latter sub-group of participants would fall outside the 
explanatory reach of the currently formulated selective processing model, which 
captures the behaviour of the majority of reasoners who demonstrate a degree of 
logically erroneous responding when tackling belief-oriented problems. The apparent 
inability of the present version of the model to account for the behaviour of all 
reasoners is clearly problematic, and tackling this issue formed the central motivation 
for the study presented here. 
Method 
Participants 
The study involved 130 participants: 70 undergraduates from the University of 
Derby and 60 Oxfam employees (age range: 18 to 60 years). All were untrained in 
logic and the psychology of reasoning.  
Design 
A standard belief-bias paradigm was used involving a 2 x 2 repeated-measures 
design that systematically manipulated the logic of conclusions (valid vs. invalid) and 
their belief status (believable vs. unbelievable). Dependent measures were conclusion 
acceptance rates and response times to register accept/reject decisions.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Sixteen syllogisms were presented: eight conflict problems (four valid-
unbelievable; four invalid-believable) and eight non-conflict problems (four valid-
believable; four invalid-unbelievable). Standard experimental controls were 
implemented relating to syllogistic forms (AB-BC vs. BA-CB figures), logical 
quantifiers (IEO vs. EIO moods) and preferred conclusion orders (A-C vs. C-A 
conclusions). These controls neutralise the effect of various response biases that can 
have an impact on performance (Evans et al., 1983; Stupple & Ball, 2007).  
Problem content was based on that used by Quayle and Ball (2000), where 
unbelievable conclusions were false by definition (e.g., Some snakes are not reptiles), 
while believable conclusions were true by definition (e.g., Some reptiles are not 
snakes). There were equal numbers of valid and invalid problems and equal numbers 
of believable and unbelievable conclusions. The presentation order of syllogisms was 
counterbalanced using a balanced Latin square design, with contents rotated through 
the 16 problems. Authorware 6.5 for Windows was used to present syllogisms and 
record responses and response times.  
A logic index was calculated for each participant based on responses to all 16 
syllogisms, enabling participants to be classified as high-logic, medium-logic or low-
logic responders. This logic index (VB + VU - IB - IU) ranged from -8 to +8 and 
measured the difference between an individual’s acceptance of valid and invalid 
conclusions; the bigger the index, the more normative the individual’s responding. 
Results 
Aggregate Data: Manipulation Check 
The data for conclusion acceptance rates are depicted in Figure 2a, and follow 
the standard pattern established by Evans et al. (1983) and replicated in subsequent 
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studies. More valid conclusions were accepted than invalid conclusions (28% 
difference), more believable conclusions were accepted than unbelievable conclusions 
(25% difference), and the effect of belief was more marked on invalid than valid 
conclusions (nearly double the magnitude). A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA on 
the conclusion acceptance data confirmed the significance of the main effect of logic, 
F(1, 129) = 153.20, MSE = 1.07, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.54, the main effect of belief,  F(1, 
129) = 87.37, MSE = 1.47, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.40, and the belief-by-logic interaction, 
F(1, 129) = 18.11, MSE = 0.82, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.12. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Response-time data (Figure 2b) also replicated previous findings: conflict 
problems took longer to process than non-conflict problems, with particularly long 
times for invalid-believable items. Response time data were subjected to a log 
transformation to eliminate positive skew prior to inferential analysis. A 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed longer processing times (mean difference: 
2.40s) for problems with invalid as opposed to valid conclusions, F(1, 129) = 22.61, 
MSE = .014, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.15, but no difference between problems with believable 
versus unbelievable conclusions, F < 1. However, as seen in previous chronometric 
studies, the belief-by-logic interaction was highly reliable, F(1, 129) = 25.83, MSE = 
.015, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.17. Exploring this interaction using simple main effects 
analyses indicated significant differences between the processing times of the conflict 
and non-conflict problems for three out of four comparisons (Fs > 9.5; ps <. 005), 
with the one exception being the comparison between valid-unbelievable and invalid-
unbelievable problems (F < 1). The present chronometric data confirm that the 
invalid-believable conflict items are unique in terms of the longer time required to 
evaluate their validity status. 
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Response Time Analyses for Response Groups 
Our core prediction was that the long response latencies evident in aggregate 
data for invalid-believable problems primarily reflect the performance of a sub-group 
of individuals whose dominant response to belief-oriented problems is normative. To 
test this prediction, participants were assigned to groups on the basis of their logic 
index. This enabled partitioning of individuals into three response groups: high-logic 
responders (logic index ≥ 4, N = 34), medium-logic responders (logic index from 2-3, 
N = 48) and low-logic responders (logic index ≤ 1, N = 48). These partitions were 
driven not only by the desire to identify three distinct response groups but also by the 
need to preserve the integrity of subsequent statistical analyses.  
We suggest that categorising people into different groups on the basis of their 
responses to all 16 syllogisms represents an ideal way to demarcate individual 
differences in reasoning abilities and strategies for the purpose of our study. This is 
because a participant’s logic index represents a relatively pure measure of their 
success in reaching a normative conclusion to belief-oriented problems, rather than a 
proxy measure based on an assessment of working memory capacity or intelligence. 
Although these latter measures are certainly correlated with logical reasoning 
(Kyllonen & Christal, 1990) they also embody additional variance unrelated to such 
reasoning, which could undermine the opportunity to detect clear-cut differences in 
the chronometric profiles of high-, medium, and low-logic responders within the 
present paradigm. It was only by grouping participants according to these latter three 
categories that we could be certain to provide definitive evidence regarding our 
prediction that high-logic responders have longer response latencies for invalid-
believable problems relative to other response groups and problem types. 
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Figure 3 presents response-time data (log-transformed but converted back into 
original units) for the four problems types broken down by response group. A mixed-
design ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of problem type, F(3, 381) = 17.64, 
MSE = .015, p = .001, ηp
2 
= 0.12, with valid-believable problems being processed 
faster than all other problem types (all ps < .001) and invalid-believable problems 
being processed slower than all other problem types (all ps < .001). Valid-
unbelievable and invalid-unbelievable problems did not differ (p = .81). There was 
also a significant main effect of response group, F(2, 127) = 11.33, MSE = .152, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= 0.15, with post-hoc tests (Bonferroni corrected) showing that: (1) the high-
logic group was 8.9s slower at responding than the low-logic group (p < .001); (2) the 
medium-logic group was 6.74s slower at responding than the low-logic group (p = 
.001); and (3) the high-logic group was 2.23s slower than the medium-logic group, 
although this latter difference was not significant (p = .99).  
(Figure 3 about here) 
Importantly for our predictions, this ANOVA also revealed the presence of a 
significant interaction between problem type and response group, F(6, 381) = 2.45, 
MSE = .015, p = .025, ηp
2 
= 0.04. Simple main effects analyses were conducted to 
unpack this interaction. Response group impacted on response times for valid-
unbelievable conflict problems, F(2, 205.9) = 4.94, MSE = .049, p = .008, with 
Games-Howell tests indicating that the high-logic and medium-logic groups processed 
these problems more slowly (by 6.60s and by 5.39s, respectively) than the low-logic 
group (p = .027; p = .029). The high-logic and medium-logic groups did not differ (p 
= .91). The group differences were even more pronounced for the invalid-believable 
problems, F(2, 205.9) = 16.59, MSE = .048, p < .001, with the high-logic and 
medium-logic groups being slower (by 14.33s and by 9.33s, respectively) than the 
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low-logic group (both ps < .001), and with the high-logic group being 5.00s slower 
than the medium-logic group, but not reliably so (p = .24).  
The same pattern emerged for the non-conflict problems, with a reliable 
simple main effect for valid-believable problems, F(2, 205.9) = 6.27, MSE = .049, p = 
.002, underpinned by significant differences between the low-logic group and the 
other groups (both ps < .01), while the latter groups did not differ (p = .76). Invalid-
unbelievable problems also demonstrated this pattern, F(2, 205.9) = 9.49, MSE = 
.049, p < .001 (high-logic vs. low-logic, p =.001; medium-logic vs. low-logic, p = 
.002; medium-logic vs. high-logic responders,  p= .93). Although these data perhaps 
indicate a general “cautiousness” in reasoning as normative performance improves, in 
the following simple main effects analyses conducted at the level of response groups 
it is clear that normative responders also vary in their response times across problem 
types, which militates against a pure cautiousness effect. 
Simple main effects analyses conducted at each level of logic group (with a 
Bonferroni corrected alpha of p < .007 for follow-up tests) indicated that although 
there was a difference in response times across problem types for the low-logic group, 
F(3, 141) = 3.65, MSE = .012, p =.014, there were no reliable follow-up comparisons. 
For the medium-logic group the contrast in response times across problem types was 
more pronounced, F(3, 141) = 7.76, MSE = .016, p < .001, but only the comparison 
between invalid-believable and valid-believable items was reliable (p < .001). 
Critically, however, the uniqueness of the invalid-believable items was particularly 
salient in the high-logic group, F(3, 99) = 8.97, MSE = .017, p < .001, where these 
items displayed increased response times compared with valid-believable (p < .001), 
valid-unbelievable (p = .002) and invalid-unbelievable (p = .002) items, with no 
contrasts between other items nearing significance (ps > .50).  
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Overall, the interaction between problem type and response group supports our 
core hypothesis that the relatively long response latencies evident in aggregate data 
for invalid-believable problems primarily reflect the performance of normatively-
responding individuals whose assiduous analysis of these problems leads to prolonged 
response latencies.   
Regression Analysis for all Problem Types 
A further strength of the methodology employed is that it permits an 
examination of whether only response times for invalid-believable items are uniquely 
predictive of normative responding (which would be congruent with our overarching 
hypothesis) or whether response times for each problem type predicts normative 
responding. To examine this issue we treated normative responses (as measured by 
the logic index) as a continuous variable rather a categorical one so as to increase the 
sensitivity of the analysis; we then pursued a multiple regression analysis to examine 
the extent to which the log-transformed response times for the differing problem types 
predicted normative responding. 
The model that included all four problem types was highly reliable, R = .45, 
adjusted R
2
 = .18, F(4, 125) = 7.93, p < .001. Standardised regression coefficients for 
each problem type indicated that an increase in response times for invalid-believable 
problems was associated with an increase in logic index, standardised Beta = .58, 
t(125) = 4.06, p < .001. However, none of the other problem types made a significant 
independent contribution toward accounting for the variance in the logic index: valid-
believable, standardised Beta = -.10, t(125) = -0.75, p = .46; valid-unbelievable, 
standardised Beta = -.05, t(125) = -0.40, p = .69; and invalid-unbelievable, 
standardised Beta = -.03, t(125) = -0.25, p = .81. These regression findings confirm 
that the most important factor in accounting for levels of overall normative 
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responding was the processing effort devoted by participants to the more difficult 
invalid-believable conflict problems. To put it another way, those participants who 
worked the hardest at trying to reason out a solution to the invalid-believable 
problems were those who also demonstrated the highest logic indices.  
Item-Based Analysis 
As a final analysis we checked whether the response-time effect observed for 
invalid-believable problems generalised across all four of the invalid-believable 
problem forms used in the experiment or whether the effect was restricted to a few 
invalid-believable items. The four invalid-believable problems forms varied in mood 
and figure as follows: (1) AB-BC, IEO; (2) BA-CB, EIO; (3) BA-CB, IEO; and (4) 
AB-BC, EIO. There were no significant differences in response times across these 
four forms, and neither was there a significant form-by-group interaction (both Fs < 
1). We also note that these problem forms were presented in eight different 
counterbalanced versions and were rotated across all problem contents. We are 
confident, therefore, that response-time effects for invalid-believable problems were 
not driven by a sub-set of items, but instead generalised across all items.  
Discussion 
Our findings reveal clear individual differences in response times for belief-
oriented syllogisms, with invalid-believable conflict items showing particularly 
marked variations in response times relative to other problems types as well as across 
response groups. These findings, moreover, are broadly interpretable in terms of the 
assumptions of the selective processing model of belief bias presented in Figure 1 
(Evans, 2007a). Our low-logic group (overall accuracy ≤ 56%) responded reliably 
faster to all problems than either the medium-logic or the high-logic groups, and 
response times for different problem types within this group did not differ. As such, 
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individuals in the low-logic group appeared to be operating primarily on the basis of a 
response bias as depicted as the default mode of responding in the selective 
processing model (i.e., they mostly evaluated conclusions by means of a rapid, low-
effort, heuristic route that was driven by the belief status of presented conclusions).  
 Individuals in the medium-logic group (overall accuracy 57%-74%) 
demonstrated significantly longer response times for all problems compared with the 
low-logic group, and also took longest to process the invalid-believable items, 
although only the time difference between invalid-believable and valid-believable 
problems was reliable. In terms of the standard selective processing model (Figure 1) 
these participants appear to be reasoning via the analytic route (e.g., conducting a 
satisficing search for a mental model that supports invalid-believable conclusions and 
refutes valid-unbelievable conclusions). This analytic search results in increased 
response times relative to the low-logic group and allows these individuals to 
demonstrate a modicum of logical competence, especially when dealing with the 
valid-unbelievable conclusions where a refuting model does not exist. 
Finally, individuals in the high-logic group (overall accuracy ≥ 75%) again 
demonstrated significantly longer response times for all problems compared to the 
low-logic group, and also revealed significantly increased response times for the 
invalid-believable problems relative to all other problem types. This latter finding 
suggests that these individuals are doing more than merely searching for a supporting 
model for a presented invalid-believable conclusion, since such a model is available 
and would encourage conclusion acceptance rather than the conclusion rejection that 
was typically observed. We propose that normatively responding reasoners are often 
uniquely able to avoid analytic processing biases so as to engage in a diligent search 
for counterexample models even when the presented conclusions are believable and 
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consistent with possible models of the premises. However, this rigorous search 
process, coupled with the need to overcome analytic processing biases, incurs the 
observed processing cost in terms of additional time on task.  
Overall, our individual differences analysis of response times enables us to 
reconcile the selective processing model of belief bias (Evans, 2007a) with 
chronometric evidence that, at first sight, appeared to be troublesome for this model 
when viewed at an aggregate level (Ball et al., 2006; Stupple & Ball, 2008). Our more 
penetrating analysis of the data indicates that people of differing logical ability have 
different response-time profiles, with these profiles providing good evidence to 
support key selective processing assumptions. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the 
current version of the selective processing model (Figure 1) does not explicitly 
capture the reasoning behaviour of those participants whose dominant response to 
belief-oriented syllogisms is normative, and we therefore propose a slightly modified 
model that can accommodate this sub-set of reasoners who conduct a more exhaustive 
search for counterexample models (Figure 4).  
(Figure 4 about here) 
The reconciliation between chronometric evidence and the selective 
processing model is important since this model arguably provides the most 
comprehensive extant account of belief-bias phenomena (Ball, 2010). Moreover, the 
present findings resonate well with the broader dual-process literature in which 
similar chronometric patterns have been shown in judgment and decision-making 
(JDM) tasks, where participants demonstrate inflated response times to conflict 
problems (e.g., Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). An interesting 
aspect of these previous studies is that while the response-time effect for conflict 
problems was particularly marked for high-ability reasoners it was nevertheless still 
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present, though diminished, for low-ability reasoners. At first sight this finding seems 
to depart from our data (Figure 3), which appear to demonstrate that the increased 
latencies for conflict versus non-conflict problems are restricted to the more 
normative responders and do not arise in the low-logic group. However, the predicted 
trend is hinted at in our low-logic group, and when we analysed the latency data with 
a direct planned contrast the evidence for significantly longer latencies for conflict 
versus non-conflict problems was reliable, t(47) = 1.91, p = .031, one-tailed. In this 
way the present data seem compatible with findings from the JDM literature and 
suggest that even in our low-logic group there is some degree of sensitivity to logic-
belief conflicts, perhaps arising from the processing approach of a sub-set of these 
individuals. 
We finally note that we have recently become aware of another contemporary 
study by Thompson, Morley, and Newstead (2011) that also takes an individual 
differences stance in examining chromomeric data within a belief-bias paradigm. 
Thompson et al.’s study employed an analysis strategy directly equivalent to that 
advanced in the present paper, whereby they split their sample into three groups based 
on their syllogistic reasoning performance and analysed response times as a function 
of group. Their findings, broadly speaking, were comparable to ours, with long 
latencies for invalid-believable problems being most marked for the highest 
performing group (i.e., individuals possessing demonstrable analytic ability).  
We give full credit to Thompson et al. (2011) for their important and timely 
observations but we also note methodological reasons for why our study represents an 
important replication and extension of their research. First, their analysis was based 
on data from five experiments that involved noticeable variations in syllogistic figure, 
materials, testing conditions (groups vs. individuals), delays (simultaneous vs. non-
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simultaneous presentation of premises and conclusion) and truth types (definitionally 
vs. empirically believable conclusions). The resulting lack of control arising from this 
combined data analysis could have increased Type I and Type II error rates. Second, 
Type I and Type II errors may also have arisen from the way Thompson et al. 
removed extreme data-points, which involved eliminating the top and bottom 2% of 
responses. The data transformation approach that we applied to normalise response 
times and stabilise variances is arguably superior in counteracting violations of 
parametric test assumptions. In sum, we contend that the close correspondence 
between our response time findings and those of Thompson et al. (2011) presents a 
compelling independent corroboration of their data. Where we differ markedly, 
however, is in our theoretical interpretation of findings. Thompson et al. claim that a 
dual-process theory such as the selective processing model cannot accommodate 
evidence for increased times arising for invalid-believable problems relative to other 
problem types. As we have demonstrated, this claim is not sustainable since a 
modified selective processing model can readily accommodate the full pattern of 
processing times seen across different response groups.  
Thompson et al. (2011) further argue that the only existing explanation for 
their findings is the one presented by Thompson et al. (2003), which accounts for long 
processing times for invalid-believable problems as arising from two factors: (1) 
people’s motivation to work harder with believable conclusions, which are claimed to 
be more palatable; and (2) people’s difficulty in evaluating invalid conclusions, which 
have been shown to require more mental-model construction relative to valid 
conclusions (e.g., Quayle & Ball, 2000). Interestingly, Thompson et al.’s assumptions 
predict that invalid-believable problems will have long response times regardless of 
whether a participant responds “yes” (non-normatively) or “no” (normatively). They 
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claimed support for this prediction based on trends evident in latencies across problem 
types, whereby participants appeared to take longer to respond to invalid-believable 
items compared to other items whether analyses were restricted to “no” responses or 
to “yes” responses. However, no inferential statistics were presented to validate these 
trends.   
To address this latter issue in our dataset we pursued two separate one-way 
ANOVAs comparing mean latencies across problem types, the first analysis focusing 
on participants (N = 75) who responded “yes” to at least one problem of each type and 
the second analysis doing the same for participants (N = 38) who responded “no” to at 
least one problem of each type. Neither analysis provided evidence in support of 
Thompson et al.’s prediction, although we acknowledge that our data may be limited 
by the focus on “inconsistent” responders. Thompson et al.’s prediction contrasts with 
the modified selective processing view, which is that normatively correct “no” 
responses to invalid-believable problems should be slower (i.e., more effortful) than 
non-normative “yes” responses. As a test of this prediction we conducted a t-test on 
the latency data for participants with inconsistent response profiles to invalid-
believable problems (i.e., where they responded “no” to some of these problems and 
“yes” to others). We observed that the rejection of invalid-believable conclusions took 
significantly longer than their acceptance (25.77s vs. 21.18s), t(85) = 3.36, p < .001, d 
= .30, fully supporting the modified selective processing account. 
To provide further support for dual-process accounts of belief bias such as the 
selective processing model, research could benefit from in-depth exploration of the 
patterns of neurological activation associated with different responses on logic-belief 
conflict problems (see De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003, for 
preliminary research). Goel and Dolan (2003), for example, have provided evidence 
   When Logic and Belief Collide       - 19 - 
that different reasoning strategies underpin normative versus non-normative responses 
to conflict problems, with normative responses engaging the right lateral prefrontal 
cortex (a region concerned with cognitive monitoring), and belief-based responses 
engaging the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (implicated in affective processing). As 
proposed in this paper, the capacity to generate normative responses to certain conflict 
problems presumably comes at the cost of having to devote extra time not only to 
inhibiting default, heuristic responses but also to avoiding selective-processing biases 
associated with analytic intervention. Both inhibitory mechanisms may well require 
intensive cognitive monitoring mediated by the ventral medial prefrontal cortex. 
Future neuroimaging studies should ideally pay particular attention to individual 
differences in reasoning strategies in order to provide further insights into the 
mechanisms involved in conflict-detection and response inhibition. 
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Figure 1:  
The selective processing model of belief bias. This figure was previously published in 
Evans (2007a; Figure 4.3, p. 91) and is reproduced here by permission of Taylor & 
Francis Group. 
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Figure 2: 
(a) Mean percentage conclusion acceptance rates (+/- SE) and (b) mean response time 
in seconds (+/- SE) for all problem types as a function of logic and belief 
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Figure 3:   
Mean response time in seconds (transformed data converted to original units) for all 
problem types as a function of response group 
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Figure 4:   
A modified selective processing model of belief bias that captures the behaviour of 
three sub-groups of reasoners: (1) non-normative responders, who do not engage in 
analytic inhibition, instead operating on the basis of a response bias; (2) satisficing 
responders, who reason via the analytic route and conduct a satisficing search for a 
single mental model that supports a believable conclusion or that refutes an 
unbelievable conclusion; and (3) normative responders, who reason via the analytic 
route and conduct an exhaustive search for counterexample models. 
 
 
